SonexBuilders.net

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Repor ... l&IType=FA

Final report is out.

Sounds like what most of us expected to hear. Unexplained loss of power on climb out with subsequent stall/spin. It's too bad they never did determine the reason for the engine failure.

We certainly do see that as years in aviation go by, that it's the same old problems that end up haunting pilots - even experienced ones. It's such a shame that we lost such a great member of the flying community.

Sure is disappointing that the cause wasn't determined. The report makes me wonder if the turbo would make white smoke seconds before it seized due to the extreme heat of friction. If not from that, then I wonder if the turbo stopping would make the mixture go extremely rich due to lack of air. Leaning would have been the right thing to do in that case.

The report indicated that someone else had flown with the turbo, and a partial seizure wouldn't allow the plane to climb. With two passengers and a total seize, I wouldn't think it would even maintain straight and level - based on the official report.

Really sad.

The takeoff roll of 1700ft has me thinking there was a problem from the start. With the prop being more pitched for the turbo, if it didn't spin up, you wouldn't have the RPMs necessary for a climb out. The MGL could have been recording the RPMs and airspeed, but the report didn't mention any engine metrics harvested from it. I have mine set to constantly record every flight and just overwrite old entries. It does appear everyone involved did a thorough investigation and we just don't know.

1700 foot roll out bugs the hell out of me too. I'm not sure I trust that data. I would be in total panic mode if my wheels were still on the ground after 1700 ft but I have a 3300. I would think ht turbo falls somewhere between mine and the 80 hp. 1700 is more than double the Sonex published takeoff roll for the standard Aerovee. I realize that there were two guys in the plane but it still seems excessive.

To me, this is the statement that we should all take lessons from:

Calculations showed that, had the pilot used the entire runway for takeoff,
sufficient runway for a landing following the loss of engine power would likely have been
available.

No matter how rushed/keen you are to get airborne, if you have the runway available, use it! This might just be the one where you actually need it!

rizzz wrote:To me, this is the statement that we should all take lessons from:

Calculations showed that, had the pilot used the entire runway for takeoff,
sufficient runway for a landing following the loss of engine power would likely have been
available.

No matter how rushed/keen you are to get airborne, if you have the runway available, use it! This might just be the one where you actually need it!

BINGO! This, more than anything else, is the lesson we should all take away from this very unfortunate accident. There is NO reason to leave runway behind you. Believe it!!

Joe,

I agree that extra runway is nice insurance, especially when it's available and cheap (the price of a few minutes taxi). However, I get worried when people start parroting this sentiment without really thinking about it. Each decision, including the decision to operate at the extreme of your envelope, should be carefully considered. You need to determine whether the operation is possible, and then think through the risks associated with doing it. If you do this honestly and deliberately you'll consider ways to mitigate, and then be ready to handle any remaining risk.

I think the thought process that should have happened here (maybe it did?) was to consider the risk of an intersection takeoff (including getting less performance than you anticipate), consider ways to mitigate (full length? changes to technique?), think through the residual risk (including emergency options and outs), then make a go/no decision (including a plan of action). This is no different than a glider pilot talking through a rope break (power failure!) from the takeoff roll (land straight ahead) to a break below 200 ft ( turn slightly, but don't stall!) to above 200 ft (turn back). You brief it every time so you force yourself to think it through all over again.

My point is that we should strive towards risk-informed decision making, and not simply risk avoidance.

Jeff

Two other reinforcements...

1) FLY THE PLANE! Fly it into a tree. Fly it into a building. Fly it into a parked car. Fly it into the side of a mountain. None will feel good but you're much more likely to survive if you're in control of the aircraft when it makes contact with an object. Just make sure you don't panic and spin it in.

2) The impossible turn is bad juju! It must be a horrible instinct to overcome and way to many pilots far better than me seem to have tried and failed. Take some time to set up a safe test of the turn. It'll help reinforce why it's a bad idea, set a personal limit, and (hopefully) help you fight the urge to turn back to the runway.

I doubt he had a 1700 foot take off roll, more likely came off the ground and held it down to the end of the runway and then started pop up there.